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The article will look into processes that are connected with things and people in com -
munication, and with the creation of semiotic reality. Discrepancies that concern 
social, cultural and even physical reality of communities have not disappeared in 
the course of globalization, but have, on the contrary, become ever deeper and more 
extensive in every sense. It probably suffices to mention examples such as the Arab 
Spring, the ‘death of multiculturalism’ in Europe, the revolutions in Ukraine, dif-
ferent opinions concerning the boundary between terrorism and religious truths. 
We shall try to explain collisions of different semiotic realities by some events that 
occurred in Estonia at the beginning of the 21st century.
Keeping in mind society and culture, and semiotic processes happening in, and 
done to, these, we apparently live in an interesting time. For several reasons our era 
deserves special attention as regards some processes and phenomena to be followed 
below, since several of the phenomena to be examined have occurred also earlier in 
history, maybe even co-appeared previously as well. Yet never before (it is especially 
the 21st century that we keep in mind here) have many of those appearances been 
so extensive, so obvious and, in the light of our so-called highly developed level of 
civilization, so surprising. Globalization might probably be a term to characterize 
the diverse curiosities surrounding us nowadays – both in cultures, metacultures 
(as concerns both scholarship and also envisaging cultural developments) and the 
conditional ‘global culture’. It is clear that we can talk about globalization ever since 
the invention of the printing press, maybe even earlier (e.g. mass conventions). But 
we would probably agree that the unification of cultural units we can witness today 
has, on the one hand, reached an unprecedented scale, just as the information chan-
nels and media available create more and more uneven informational regions and 
lonely, even informationally and semiotically isolated islands, on the other hand. 
Globalization has brought along the spread of cultural units beginning from, for 
example, music and food, and ending with discussions about larger culture themes 
and topics like the economic, social and political organization of communities. It is 
important that globalization does not concern only singular cultural traits or items, 
but also broader cultural themes, for such simultaneous double flow of artifac-
tual as well as purely semiotic cultural units has started to unify and unite people’s 
worldviews, while it has simultaneously started to insulate worldviews, as already 
mentioned. 
 In the framework of the present paper, we will try to approach the issue from 
a viewpoint casting light on the formation of communicative contexts. Metho-
dologically, we shall depart from ideas articulated by Vilfredo Pareto about com-
ponents of the communicative situation that bind together the individual and the 
societal levels: the individual psychic state, behavioural acts, communal knowledge 
and theories of correct behaviour, and actual social ways of behaving (Pareto 1935: 
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90). Alongside with these ideas, and hand in hand with systems theory, Talcott 
Parsons’ (1952) treatment of the communicative situation and its component objects 
was developed. It is logical that communication and semiosis are, in such light, 
inevitably connected with both individual and communal metaneeds and evalua-
tion standards. Thus, we will try to view the construction of communicative con-
texts with the background knowledge of a very simple awareness of human life as 
swirling around the satisfaction of a pyramid of needs. The latter has been analysed 
thoroughly by several specialists, but let us mainly follow the logic expressed by 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1922) and Abraham Maslow (1970). For our present con-
text, a most important aspect of the logic of striving towards the satisfaction of need 
lies in Maslow’s conception of metaneeds or being-values as decisive for the self-
actualization of people. Our contemporary discourse on phenomena and cultural 
themes around us is loaded with value-based arguments, and is thus very tightly 
connected with the overall metaneeds. Metaneeds are of high informational value 
of the structure of the semiotic reality of a given community, as they actively direct 
people’s instrumental and consummatory behaviour (as discussed in Burgoon et al. 
1994: 17) in their daily lives. Instrumental communication as concerned with inten-
tional operating with the surroundings is, via metavalues, connected with identity 
discourse and consummatory semiotization of the world.
Value-based discourses offer us keys for understanding the world around us, 
and metaneeds are served, both implicitly and overtly, to us to make us see what 
really should matter in our conceptualization of things and phenomena around 
us. Metaneeds are offered to us, for example, to make sense of what is ‘evil’, what 
is ‘terror’, how to take ‘global warming’, how to behave in ‘the Christian way’, how 
to comprehend actual military activity and to explain manipulation with economic 
means interfering with the daily lives of actual people. In the light of metaneeds and 
continuous re-explanation of them, another very curious phenomenon today is the 
confrontation between diverse ideological paradigms, beginning from consumerism 
and ending with religious collisions, wide-scale and varied re-appearance of fascism, 
chauvinism and Nazism. When such ideologies clash, the circumstances that are 
connected with their semiotic build-up and functioning become even more exciting; 
the latter allow to observe the semiotic imbroglio of worldviews (that are, in one way 
or another, totalitarian) that may seem distant from one another at first glance.
What should deserve our attention is the continuous re-appearance of those 
cultural themes and ideologies that have emerged in the past and that have been 
officially condemned (amongst them specific totalitarian regimes, radical move-
ments and behaviour). Our so-to-speak global metaneeds have been shaped in both 
informal and formal discourses that both belong to the legitimized cultural sphere. 
Nevertheless we can observe the easiness with which wide-scale movements are 
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being initiated on the basis of certain denounced ideologies. One of the aims of the 
present article is to try to explain some aspects of the semiotic mechanisms, pro-
cesses and actual manners through which seemingly impossible sociocultural 
objects and phenomena are created. We shall depart from the obvious knowledge 
that the 21st century finds humanity in the repeating condition of collisions between 
groups of diverse nature, and that these collisions are mostly to do with identity dis-
course. The latter are often based on extremely simplistic metaneeds having to do 
with, for example, religious views, or concepts of good and evil quite directly derived 
from lower needs in Maslow’s pyramid. And here, these ‘simplistic metaneeds’ may 
carry the weight of a long history during which “the link between an initial referring 
term and the ‘real world’ has already been established in a prior text” (Schiffrin 2006: 
113). For us, it will be important that “links between a subsequent referring term 
and the initial referring term are delimited by the characters, activities and scenes 
already evoked in the textual world” (Schiffrin 2006: 113). Likewise, in our context 
metaneeds find active links with the linguistic and semiotic community in a specific 
physical and semiotic reality, and are thus continually at least tacitly in use by the 
mere exercise of natural language or other sign systems. For us, it will be important 
that we will be dealing with a “linguistic community outlined in time and space [...] 
that possesses a common ‘referential space’ which does not emerge anew at every 
moment, but which is of a constant nature, that makes it possible to bind certain 
general terms with certain constant reference” (Pärli 2008: 58), laying stress on the 
last aspect, and accentuating connections between general terms, constant reference, 
referential reality, metaneeds and also the physical reality.
Of course, very frequently religious and the so-to-speak practical matters have 
been combined or at least bound together, and thus we do not find ourselves sur-
prised when topics like religious enlightenment, saving the world and, for exam-
ple, the issue of living space (as referring to Lebensraum) coexist side by side in the 
explanation of military activity (the latter applies also to the issue of terrorism) and 
other quite actual undertakings. So, rushing ahead we can maintain that while on 
the one hand metaneeds are, to a certain extent, derived from the primary needs or 
at least connected with them, then on the other hand metaneeds themselves influ-
ence not only the conceptualization of the surroundings, but also the perception of 
the environment on a very physiological level. Such union of metaneeds, secondary 
and primary needs is illustrated even by the already mentioned and actually prac-
tised Lebensraum-rhetoric, although Maslow (1993: 309) himself limited his example 
to a less ideological discourse on the level of the individual: “[…] metaneeds, though 
having certain special characteristics which differentiate them from basic needs, are 
yet in the same realm of discourse and of research as, for instance, the need for vita-
min C or for calcium“ (Maslow 1993: 309).
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In these curious times, objects around us deserve particular consideration: both 
objects surrounding us in our culture, in our daily life and ordinary behaviour, as 
well as objects as constructed and operated with – both in cultures and metacul-
tures. Objects are important: any culture consists of objects, both physical and purely 
semiotic ones. All cultural objects participate in the formation of sociocultural sys-
tems, while the latter are made cohesive through communication. In his conception 
of the communicative situation Parsons has summarized the idea of the socialness 
of things and the formation of culture through objects. Let us briefly recollect the 
basics of the Parsonian understanding of communicative situations, for in its sim-
plicity and high operational value for actual analysis it is of utmost importance for 
the explanation of manipulation with items in world-view in our daily lives. 
Things and names in communicative situations
An essential factor that makes social systems and the descriptive frame of particular 
cases relative is the orientation of an actor to the communicative situation. Parsons 
(1952: 4) defined the situation as “[...] consisting of objects of orientation, so that 
the orientation of a given actor is differentiated relative to the different objects and 
classes of them of which his situation is composed”, while the object world is com-
posed of social, physical and cultural objects. Whereas a social object can be seen both 
as composed of other actors (alter) and as one who has switched him- or herself into 
the referential reality (ego), physical objects are non-interactive empirical units that 
do not respond to the ego, and cultural objects are the symbolic elements of cultural 
tradition or value patterns (Parsons 1952: 4). Besides the psychological aspects con-
cerning the dynamic (self-) determination of social objects (cf. G. H. Mead’s distinc-
tion between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’), a relational moment is implied by the cultural 
objects that can, via internalization, be included into the structural components of 
the self (Parsons 1952: 4). Until the inclusion of cultural objects into the structural 
elements of the self they, along with physical objects, form the context or setting of 
conditions for social action.
The construction of a communicative situation from the standpoint of an agent 
depends largely on the motivation of the self: only in the case of motivated attitude 
towards a situation can we talk about social action proper (Parsons 1952: 4, 543ff). 
Motivation has to do with psychological, just as well as with cultural drives (let us 
recall that Parsons was a student of Malinowski), whereas the arrangement of action 
elements is a function of the agent’s relation to his/her situation and to the history 
of that relation (Parsons 1952: 5). In this sense, communicative action is depen-
dent on the system of expectations (Parsons 1952: 5, 32ff), and similar to the logic 
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of Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of habit as a determinant of semiosis (CP 5.491). 
This implicit semiotic counterpart of analysing social systems makes the position of 
Parsons a little ambivalent: systems of expectations have evidently to do with abduc-
tive logic and thus they distance social systems from the (mechanical) cybernetic 
information systems. While Parsons could have been associated with an approach to 
culture and society that lays stress on the social factors, and can be seen as paradoxi-
cal in terms of actually setting social systems under the influence of the structural 
units of objects framing the social situation, we can finally see the dynamic relation 
between the functional and the structural categories. Parsons himself presupposed 
this dynamism as well: situational elements can obtain specific meanings and turn 
into such symbols for the self that gain importance for his/her system of expecta-
tions (Parsons 1952: 5). In the case of social interaction these signs acquire shared 
meanings and start to mediate communication between different agents; then we 
can talk about the origin of culture (Parsons 1952: 15ff). The psychological, social 
and cultural considerations are connected also in what Parsons called the cathec-
tic, cognitive and evaluative orientation modalities (Parsons 1952: 7) of interaction, 
for in order to be communicatively successful, one has to set his/her motivations in 
accordance with certain sociocultural contexts and requirements as they are con-
nected with established values. Thus communicative behaviour, at least in order 
to be successful, must be fundamentally reflective, and follow certain logical pat-
terns. These logical patterns (evaluation standards, etc.) are embedded, transmitted, 
learned and shared by culture.
In semiotics, it is an accepted truism that man lives in a certain environmental 
reality in which and of which he has created a certain semiotic reality. The con-
stituents of the semiotic reality are arbitrary in their relation to the physical realm 
and environment, and are conditional, negotiable and actually negotiated. We live 
as individuals who have gone through the process of socialization in institutions 
of diverse nature in social groups, and act in diverse sociocultural roles according 
to certain norms in society. Homo sapiens has diverse understanding of his physi-
cal environment, and this is reflected in his language as the house of being as was 
so clearly maintained already by Martin Heidegger. The sociolinguistic aspect of 
Heidegger’s thought has been transformed and transferred to us, and also to the 
sphere of semiotics, by the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. All these paradigmatic 
indicators are to do with an understanding which sees the individual, society, cul-
ture, and also the environment (as perceived and conceived) as culture-genetic in 
the end (or in the beginning, if you will). Societies are formed of individuals who 
have been formed by social groups who are formed through information flows that 
are at least guarded, if not formed or shaped, by certain sociocultural managers who 
are sometimes called the gatekeepers or re-layers. 
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Such social – and also sociocultural – control is directly linked to the topic of 
creating objects around us, naming them and segmenting them into categories. Or 
more exactly, this control is linked to the topic of concrete and abstract reference 
(or concrete and abstract concepts, see Danesi and Perron 1999: 79) in terms of how 
naming is decisive for distinguishing between the semiotic reality and the physical 
environment that oftentimes is considered as objective realm, although, in the end, it 
is a negotiated and thus a conditional sphere as well. This means that under the topic 
of naming we are dealing with a number of phenomena that cover the area from 
general names to proper names, from descriptions to definitions of the so-to-speak 
objective contents of human environment(s). We are to distinguish between talking 
about naming in the framework of the philosophy of language and in the context 
of semiotics. In philosophy, naming is mostly connected with the topic of the logic 
of reference, truth and reality. In semiotics, naming has been dealt with alongside 
such notions as (mythological) consciousness, denotation and connotation, distinc-
tive features of objects, etc. The most important moments for the current argument 
lay in the abstractness and concreteness of referents. Additionally, what is maybe 
even more important is that the relation between abstractness and concreteness is 
not absolute, universal or somehow provably solid or logical. This conditionality of 
items in our physical and semiotic environment is expressed in Pareto’s notion and 
treatment of non-logical conduct (Pareto 1935: 74) which reveals its essence in com-
municative situations, words and names used to arrange objects in those situations.
Saul Kripke’s well-known summary of logicians’ understanding of names as 
proper names was formulated as follows – they are “phrases of the form ‘the x such 
that φx’, such as ‘the man who corrupted Hadleyburg’” (Kripke 1981: 24). That ‘man’ 
serves as an example of the referent of the given description. Therefore, Kripke 
considers the possibility of uniting names and descriptions under a common term 
‘designators’. Designators, however, lead us to the topic of intentionality and to the 
negotiated nature of meanings and names of objects. It is important that this nego-
tiated nature concerns, in the end, also the reality-degree of objects. The reality-
degree, in turn, is describable at least on the axes of concrete and abstract reference, 
and the possibility and impossibility of objects. The possibility and impossibility of 
objects in terms of the probability of creating, accepting and using them has, just as 
in the literary sphere, to do with the suspension of disbelief.
An analogous trend of understanding proper names can actually be met in semi-
otics as well. For example, as maintained by Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij, the 
general meaning of the proper name is principally tautological: a name or another 
is not characterized by differential features, but merely signifies an object to which 
it has been attached. Consequently, a set of objects with the same name does not 
necessarily imply any other special features except the characteristic of bearing the 
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given name. In this line, Lotman and Uspenskij (1973) can be linked with Roman 
Jakobson’s (1971: 131) treatment of ‘puppyhood’, ‘Fido’ and ‘fidoness’. However, 
the boundary between names and descriptions is often, maybe even in most cases, 
vague. A relatively simple type of descriptions is produced in order to refer to some-
body or something, to single out specific objects in the world. Kripke uses the rela-
tively widespread example of a cocktail party and a reference to ‘the man over there 
with the champagne in his glass is happy’ (Kripke 1981: 25). This example takes us 
to the area of genuine semiotics, when keeping in mind suggestions of tying it up 
with the possibility of lying: the reference to ‘that man over there’ would most prob-
ably work whether or not his glass contains any champagne (which can be replaced, 
for example, with water). It is noteworthy, that in the case of naming, or such kind 
of descriptive reference, lying may occur unintentionally; apparently such uninten-
tionality is an especially acute issue in the process of naming as an everyday practise. 
Lying as such a favoured subject in semiotics, in turn, connects us back to philo-
sophical discourse and specific logical issues that can be gathered under the topic of 
the so-called impossible objects.
Such links between philosophy and semiotics that arise from the subject matter 
of naming, in fact bind together also humanities and social sciences in a wider per-
spective. Truth, reference, reality, semiotic reality are factually socioculturally nego-
tiated phenomena that depend on the Parsonian communicative situation. Therefore 
we should be very conscious of the connection of things, objects in communicative 
situations, and how those things are called – named, if you will.
 In what follows, we will try to show how communicative situations can be 
bluntly manipulated, and how things surrounding us can be turned around in a 
roundabout way. The way in which three main constituent fields of communicative 
situations – the physical, cultural, and social objects – can be defined, solved and 
created turns out to be a key issue through which to observe analytically the topic 
of naming as ranging from proper names to descriptions, and even to descriptions 
in proper names. And even more importantly – this is a key issue for defining and 
understanding objects around us: the scale of objects, the classes of objects, the seg-
mentation of our diverse environments into objects of various kinds. The creation 
of objects and respective management of communicative situations through legiti-
mated metaneeds is certainly requiring a state of mind characterized by suspension 
of disbelief, which is most likely to be achieved and effectively executed in different 
kinds of totalitarian regimes.
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New social species: An example of the Soviet Man
Let us consider an example from Estonia 2007 – an example probably very well 
known internationally. This example concerns the notorious case of the Bronze 
Soldier (for chronology, see Alatalu 2008), a monument to the Soviets who, accord-
ing to one version (the version, of course, belonging to the Soviet discourse), liber-
ated Estonia (and Europe), and according to another first freed and then occupied 
the whole of Eastern Europe (for example, the Estonian, or, probably, even the con-
temporary European discourse). So, let us be concerned only with this very brief ex-
ample how the whole event was treated on the very territory of Estonia. A summary, 
merely in a few words: the removal of the Bronze Soldier has widely been treated as 
an elimination of a Soviet statue by the Estonian government, and at the same time 
popular rumours spread also in the mass media say that the whole issue was orches-
trated from Moscow with Putin’s administration involved, and was used as a pos-
sibility for a coup to overthrow the Estonian state regime. There were mass protests 
against the removal of the monument in Russia, as well as demonstrations organized 
from Russia in the Estonian capital. One of the main organizers of those protests was 
the so-called Putinjugend under the name of Nashi that also protested at and block-
aded the Estonian Embassy in Moscow, there were alarming cyber-attacks against 
Estonian governmental and nongovernmental organisations (including banks). The 
whole affair was serious and in Tallinn Estonia faced the vastest looting and street 
violence by gangs ever seen in history, including WWII. However, inasmuch as the 
actual events in Tallinn mostly occurred in the streets, it is very difficult to point at 
specific documented events or written materials expressing ideological standpoints 
involved (however, see Liiv 2007; Alatalu 2008; Põld 2008; Ehala 2009).
Estonia reportedly has a democratic rule and free press, and that free press has 
a non-governmental part, which has capitalist owners; this applies to virtually all 
printed press in the Estonian language. On the other hand, there is at least partially 
state-supported press printed in the Russian language. When we consider the case 
of the Bronze Soldier, we could notice a situation that is probably best summarized 
in the comparison of Estonian- and Russian-language presses, especially versions 
of a newspaper that is published parallelly both in Estonian and in Russian (see 
Figure 1). The case is about two radically different messages about the same event, 
which probably refer to two separate information spaces.
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Figure 1. Excerpts from Linnaleht (City Paper) May 1, 2007.
Linnaleht (City Paper) is a weekly paper and the example in question comes from 
its Tallinn issue of May 1, 2007. This picture depicts the situation on the day the 
Bronze Soldier had already been relocated to a military cemetery in Tallinn. This is 
perhaps a clear example of how propaganda is made, and how the semiotic reality 
of a social (although probably not sociocultural) group is managed by goalkeepers. 
The Estonian-language version on the left-hand side reports that the Bronze soldier 
has been re-erected, supporting this information with a relevant photograph. On the 
right-hand side we can view an image in the Russian-language edition of what is in 
principle the same paper, accompanied by information about the police having re-
stricted the access to the military cemetery for the time of construction work. In the 
picture we can see an empty lot without the statue, while from the news story be-
side it (categorized as ‘scandal’) it is practically impossible to understand, where the 
monument was actually located at that particular time: the headline refers to ‘The 
Bronze soldier in the cemetery’, which can just as well as be associated with indefi-
nite plans for the future. There is no need to repeat the value of visual information 
and the power pictorial images have over verbal information. In our case the effect 
of ‘visual verification’ is supported by the saying “One picture speaks more than a 
thousand words” which practitioners firmly keep in mind.
 The particular social group targeted by the Russian-language edition is very dif-
ficult to define because it is formed of the remnants of Soviet people imported into 
Estonia during the Soviet occupation. These people have not become integrated 
in Estonian society; they have stuck to the principle of not learning the Estonian 
language; they consider Estonian territory as legitimately belonging to Russian 
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geopolitical and cultural space. These people cannot be considered as Russians, but 
rather as Soviets – a new species the regime actually managed to develop all over the 
Soviet Union whose residue in the form of the proposed New Soviet Man are caus-
ing counter-cultural problems all over the former forcefully unified territory. Those 
problems basically concern the identity of people who are, in fact, a sociocultural 
invention of a totalitarian regime, and who, in terms of identity and integration in 
a novel sociocultural environment and communicative situations, remain societal 
and cultural outsiders. Or, as Jurgen Ruesch (1972: 204) has described them, they are 
rootless individuals “living on fringes of culture, seeking in new culture the old sym-
bols”, or have even become dependent on living as a minority group for they cannot 
connect with the core culture.
Artificial races are not a new invention, and can be met already in the medieval 
worldview. Yet, diverse medieval antipodes rather served as semiotic constructs, or 
were derived from the people whom Europeans actually met during their colonial 
travels and whose ideals of beauty were expressed in bodily mutations. This is a spe-
cific and vast issue on which we have no time to dwell in length. Our present context 
is concerned with the vigorous will of creators of new massive ideologies to generate 
a novel man to inhabit a new world order – communism, Nazism and other simi-
lar openly totalitarian, designed and planned regimes. When we remind ourselves 
of the logic of the above-described communicative situations, this is quite natural: 
the new world is based on a new ideology that governs all communicative situations 
through which the sociocultural reality is constructed, and all communicative situ-
ations must include new and better social objects instead of the aged, degraded and 
incomplete existing humans. 
The creation of new races usually has to solve two main problems: the physical 
and the mental one. A simplest way of bettering the physical base for a new race is 
to bring Homo sapiens to a higher level of physical capacity. Some of the latest rele-
vant wide-scale examples can be given from the preparation of the Arian race in the 
Nazi Germany, or the Communist Man in the Soviet Union. The physical improve-
ment of the human body was not limited to an active lifestyle and exercise, but reached 
eugenics. Eugenics had its so-to-speak mild form in the form of, for example, officially 
organised brothel service system for the Aryan man, and its range ended in the hands 
of “doctors” in prison camps. Yet the Nazi plan for populating the new Reich with a 
new man was about improving the existing people, while the Soviet Union was work-
ing on a completely new biological being who would both physically and intellectu-
ally surpass Homo sapiens. That new biological being was to be the Communist, and 
surpassing the man of the previous evolutionary level was important both for the very 
development of communism, and also for the spreading of the World Revolution. Ilya 
Ivanovich Ivanov’s work in the area of human-ape hybridization experiments (see e.g. 
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Rossiianov 2002, Shishkin 2003) is the most well-known and serves as a telling exam-
ple to illustrate the whole topic and case in point.
It is hard to see major differences between the ideologies of the Nazis and the 
Soviets in their plans for better social orders and their strive to create a new human 
who would live in those orders. The similarities concern both scientific efforts as well 
as practical steps taken in organizing the life span of the already existing people. We 
know about the categorization of men in the Nazi Germany’s military forces – we can 
easily recall the Hitlerjugend and other preparatory institutions for the so-to-speak 
ultimate human. The Soviet man had to follow a similar trajectory of socialization: 
Child of October → Young Pioneer → Communist Youth (Komsomol) → Communist.
Against such a background, the Soviets all over the vast territory of the Soviet 
Union had been provided with a fully organized semiotic reality, they were defined 
socially and culturally, as well as in terms of geographical and environmental iden-
tity. Even today, it is interesting that in spite of the collapse of the Soviet Union the 
Soviet regime did manage – at least to a certain extent – to create its own nation 
that was, in its artificial essence, dissimilar from all the existing ones. This suc-
cess is actually ongoing as verified even in Putinjugend’s contemporary identifica-
tion discourse that follows the former Soviet ideology in combination with modern 
Putinism (for example, in their introduction on their Internet page they use the web 
address not of Russia, but that of the Soviet Union: ‘www.nashi.su’). After the dis-
integration of the Soviet Union, also the identity realm of the Soviet Man was shat-
tered, and in many countries they were started to be treated as the so-called Fifth 
Column. Just as Putin, a former KGB officer, they consider the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, that links up with the general 
pseudocommunist totalitarian discourse of contemporary Russia. 
At the same time, the Soviet residue in the area of the former Union neither 
want to move back to Russia or to other countries of origin because of differences 
in the living standards (at least in the case of Estonia), nor do they feel actually com-
pelled to, since according to themselves the land where they live “belongs to them” 
(“vsyo nashe!”) – this was claimed in the streets also during the Tallinn riots in 
Spring 2007. Rather, their efforts concern(ed) the restoration of the Soviet regime. 
In Estonia, their situation is difficult, because more-or-less formally they bear the 
name of Russians, they often have Estonian citizenship, they are simultaneously 
Europeans and Asians (in several aspects), they are pushed into several linguistic 
realms at the same time, and so on. Therefore, it is additionally very difficult to orga-
nize their identity discourse in terms of supporting it in the physical reality. In other 
terms, in a situation that is quite novel in principle, the Soviets became unable to 
relate their semiotic reality with the environment, and became linguistically, com-
municatively, and semiotically incompetent (in the Chomskian sense); they became 
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unable to construct communicative situations (in the Parsonian sense) in a wholly 
renewed physical, social and cultural environment after the constituents of the old 
communicative situations had collapsed. In the days of the Soviet Union (if seen 
from the admistrative central zone), people’s sociocultural reality was clearly defined 
in all three aspects of communication – the social objects (true communists with 
diverse communist roles in communist institutions); the cultural objects (for exam-
ple, socialist art, socialist living standards, and daily style); and the physical objects 
(although it must be said that in a totalitarian regime it is hard to find physical 
objects that would not be loaded with ideology; here the Soviet infrastructure, the 
so-called Soviet Land itself, and other both physical and semiotic could be located). 
All these objects and aspects in communicative situations were governed and guided 
by specific Communist-Soviet metavalues.
The identity discourse all over the former Soviet Union, as concerns the Soviet 
Man who managed to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union and other cataclys-
mic events, is a vivid example of displacement: their identity is now displaced both 
in terms of time (referring back to the former Soviet Union times) and in terms of 
space (connected not even, perhaps, with Russia, but specifically with the Kremlin 
as the centration zone). They, particularly a few of the leader-like persons of the 
remaining Soviets (in Estonia, for example, individuals once connected to the 
Interfront movement), become what some Soviet leaders (Lenin, Stalin) some-
times reportedly called ‘useful idiots’ — originally a phrase to refer to those Western 
reporters and travellers who would endorse the Soviet Union and its policies in the 
West in case of need and after ‘activation’. Principally and functionally, the same hap-
pened to the Soviets in the former Soviet republics. They became manipulable by the 
ideological propaganda machine of the Kremlin and Kremlin-related organizations 
(for example, on monetary or purely ideological basis). Those propaganda organiza-
tions have by now been dealing for a long period with unilateral semiotization of all 
of the three constituents of the communicative situation. Creating public informa-
tional space through unilateral semiotization is just a continuation of a Soviet system 
establishing quite fixed – or legitimized, if you will – referential relations with the 
components of the communicative situation. Again, what is highlighted is the rela-
tions between identity and communicative situation, and to the semiotization and 
solving communicative situations so as, in a minutely different phrasing, described 
by Ernst Gellner: 
In stable and self-contained communities culture is often quite invisible, but when 
mobility and context-free communication come to be of the essence of social life, 
the culture in which one has been taught to communication becomes the core of 
one’s identity. (Gellner 1983: 61) 
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Thus, in our case in Estonia, there appeared a rigid confrontation between the 
Soviets and Estonians which was and is fuelled by Russian-language media both 
in the Russian Federation and in the Republic of Estonia. This confrontation con-
cerns quite dissimilar informational spaces the two communities live in. There is 
one extremely important note to be made in connection with the referential rela-
tions in communicative situations and identity discourse. Putting it roughly: while a 
democratic information space implies the necessary connection of its societal mem-
bers and environmental contexts (including social, economic, political, cultural and 
other contexts), a totalitarian (including the Soviet and the contemporary Putinized) 
informational space is characterized by the mediation of most of the environmen-
tal stimuli. In the case of such mediated information, invention (see below) becomes 
a norm in creating information space, and through invention events, objects and 
phenomena become naturalized. A member of a totalitarian informational space 
must be detached from direct contact with the environment, for otherwise a closed 
holistic and univocal sociocultural system would be shattered (let us only recall 
the “opening of the Iron Curtain” or the schooling of illiterate suicide bombers by 
Taliban authorities).
Metaneeds and pseudorealities
The issue of metaneeds and pseudorealities touches upon the above-mentioned uni-
lateral semiotization of diverse types of objects around us. Solomon Marcus made a 
distinction between primary and non-primary communication which matches our 
division of two types of information spaces – the democratic and the totalitarian, or 
the open and the closed. While primary communication must meet the category of 
‘aboutness’ (Marcus 1992: 135–137), non-primary communication is related to com-
munication on communication and to mediated communication. Thus it causes a 
situation that for different reasons, for example economic factors, lack of knowledge, 
ideology and so forth, favours the ‘invention approach’ (on the latter, see Marcus 
1992: 137–138) and the creation of new pseudo-realities with the help of constructed 
indexical elements. These invented indexical elements may be abstract references 
constructed both on the basis of concrete or purely abstract nature.
The creation of pseudorealities through invention seems to be possible through 
the aforementioned metaneeds and cultural values. Through the examination of the 
latter, it should be possible to understand how stereotypes – in our case, the national 
(and also chauvinist) ones – can quite easily be created, facilitated, enforced and 
settled. The background of the above-mentioned conflict in Estonia between two 
semiotic and sociocultural realities was (and is) also largely formed of metaneeds. 
In the Tallinn riots of 2007, the behaviour of the Soviet Man was an expression and 
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outburst of the value system that had lost its official institutional base in the Soviet 
Union. Needless to stress that the loss of such a formal basis for institutional facts 
(for the latter, see Searle 1995) makes the boundary between the ‘objective’ and the 
‘subjective’ extremely fluid, as contents of metaneeds also can be manipulated not 
merely arbitrarily, but even randomly. During the days of the riot, as also before 
and after it, exclamations were witnessed in the media and in the streets reflect-
ing Soviet metaneeds that can be summarized in the following comparison of ste-
reotypes of the Soviet Man and Estonians as expressed by the rioters (see Figure 2; 
see also Liiv 2007). Although it is a completely illustrative table, it contains actual 
recorded expressions and phrases as well, and relates to further discourse as well 
(for example, accusation of Estonians of Nazism in 2013)1, as also to at least par-
tially analysed value discourse and self-positioning in the events of the Bronze Night 
(see Kask 2013) that can be used to describe the cultural distance between the two 
communities.
Soviets Estonians
think, behave and speak self-righteously, use 
sincere traditional language (including religious 
issues) 
speak, live in “the Western” way, use “German 
alphabet”, think and act slyly
rescuers of Europe from Nazism betrayers, joined the Nazi army
liberators of the world from capitalism and 
imperialists (work in process)
under-cover capitalists before and aft er the 
socialism in the Soviet Union
deliverers of spiritual and other freedom, 
bringers of Communism
worshippers of material things, followers of 
capitalists
deliverers of the possibility to join the Soviet 
Union
betrayers, “joined the Soviet Union at free will”, 
now accusing the SU of occupation
self-sacrifi cing missionaries people of Usura in the widest sense
à corollary: saviours a corollary: fascists, Nazis
Figure 2. A possible comparison of metaneeds expressed during the Tallinn riots of 2007.
The significance of the so-to-speak truth value of any metaneed or even a semiotic 
conception/unit can be increased by objectification or embodiment. Therefore, we 
should recall the importance of concrete reference before we take a glimpse at the 
techniques applied in order to enforce even the above-suggested contrasts between 
the metaneeds of the ‘own and the alien’ socii. When we keep in mind the emergence 
of the Soviet identity and the related Communist-Soviet consciousness in the events 
of Tallinn’s Bronze Night, we are witnessing a much more interesting and complex 
1 Baltija 2013 = http://baltija.eu/news/read/34392.
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objectification of identity elements than just, for example, fetishism which played a 
decisive role there as well. Also it is exactly about the conditionality of the bound-
ary between the concrete and abstract reference so as that the boundary implies the 
dynamics between the three main types of objects in the communicative situation.
Indeed, it is important that the community kept in mind here is associated with 
the project of creating the Soviet Man that was initiated at the beginning of the 
20th century, while the Russian nation simply happened to populate it as its first 
raw material. As we know, the Soviet Man was necessary for inhabiting the new 
state order, the Soviet Union. This was about a completely novel organizational and 
semiotic reality, and its semiotic management was quite cleverly united with offer-
ing people a new physical reality – for example, by the means of massive transloca-
tion of diverse kinds. In this sense, it is logical that for example foreign workers who 
immigrated to Estonia did not enter the Estonian cultural space or a Finno-Ugric 
community, but the Baltics or Pribaltika as such. In that conditionally and also expe-
rientally new space it was easier and simpler to operate semiotically proceeding from 
a state of tabula rasa filled and arranged by the Soviet order. Essentially, that meant 
organizing of communicative situations, relevant environments and their elements 
according to centrally delivered Party instructions. For the following generations 
of the Soviet Man the Soviet metaneeds, significant environments and evaluation 
standards became even more natural, since borders between primary and second-
ary groups lost their meaning and significance (this is well examplified by Pavel 
Morozov’s case and the relevant ideological and moralising discourse). Likewise it is 
logical that in the course of the naturalization process of the Soviet semiotic reality 
also the Soviet physical space, including ‘Pribaltika’, became natural and own for the 
Soviet Man. Therefore it is natural that the collapse of the Soviet Union was, for the 
Soviet Man, truly a ‘geopolitical catastrophe’ as Putin has put it. Re-gaining of inde-
pendence of small states occupied by the Soviet Union was a semiotic and cultural 
collapse for the Soviets, and it brought along a need for extensive re-identification in 
a situation that took them from the socioculturally dominant position to belonging 
to a minority group in a small state. Geopolitical re-positioning, break in identity 
discourse, and collapse of the semiotic reality were factors in the light of which it is 
easier to understand unilateral semiotization, and even the construction, of types of 
objects in communicative situations; these were factors via which the social and the 
cultural environments became defined and used both physically and semiotically in 
radical manners.
In the case of our example, the ‘positive values’ of the Soviets were inflated into 
the Bronze Soldier, and there is an interesting parallel for such canalization of cul-
tural metaneeds (in Maslow’s terms). It is an almost perfect example of condens-
ing descriptions into a proper name entity, and illustrates the creation of impossible 
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objects on the other hand, while leading us back to principles of practise ascribed to 
certain Native American tribes. According to Eva Lips (a surprisingly forgotten cul-
tural analyst), amongst some of the First Nations there has been the phenomenon of 
‘temporary holiness’: 
The religious primordial matter does not reside in all things or beings, but only 
in some, and does not do this at all times either. For that, I have put into use 
the notion of ‘temporarily sacred’. This can be revealed so that a starving Indian 
wondering around stands foot at a rock and complains his misery, asking for help, 
from that rock as his god; or he may even turn in pray to his hunting companion, 
his dog – but as soon as the misery is past, both the rock and the dog turn again 
into ordinary objects and lose their magical powers. These objects are not magical 
by their nature, but it is the prayer of a human that makes them sacred temporarily. 
Neill writes that “whenever a Dakota finds himself in spiritual misfortune, wants 
to escape either from real or imagined trouble, he would find for himself a round 
rock graspable for him by weight, puts it into a place free of grass and bushes, 
paints it red, offers it feathers and prays to it for help. After the ceremony has 
ended, the rock would not be treated with such respect any more. If any guest 
would want to have the rock for himself, he would get it.” (Lips 1963: 118; my 
translation – AR).
The same also happened in the Tallinn of the 21st century (it probably is worthwhile 
to repeat: in the twenty-first century), where the Bronze Soldier was turned into ‘a 
red rock’ similar to that of the Dakotas (needless to say that the ‘red rock’ thankfully 
serves here multiple connotations). The physical constituents were first turned into 
cultural objects in the communicative situation, and then made into social objects. 
A physical rock and bronze ensemble was so loaded with cultural values that it did 
not any more take an effort to guide its status from the originally physical, through 
the cultural, into a social object (as often suggested in Estonian daily media in 2007, 
it was exactly an operation, and it was conducted by and through Putin’s administra-
tion). Simultaneously, at the same time the Soviet discourse rearranged communica-
tive situations between the Estonian and the Soviet communities by an exactly op-
posite procedure with Estonians as former communicative partners. Gradually and 
swiftly Estonians as social objects in the communicative situations were identified 
as bearers of specific meanings, values and metaneeds (particularly those associated 
with the Nazis) – they became cultural objects or mere passive dummies in com-
munication, and after that physical objects. From the Soviet viewpoint it was (and is) 
logical and natural: the Estonian community was so far from the core of the Soviet 
realm that there was no overlap of the semiotic realities that could have made it pos-
sible to share sign systems necessary for even initializing communication, to say 
nothing of exchange of information or understanding. Estonians appeared as objects 
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in the scene on action – this is an example of a most typical semiotic operation that 
can be noticed in virtually all totalitarian information spaces. Such unilateral semio-
tization explains how social objects as original partners in communication can quite 
easily be turned into mere physical objects that must, in the end, be erased from 
communicative situations, because they are only obstacles in the effort of organizing 
the physical and the semiotic environment. This logic is vividly represented in to-
talitarian regimes and the shaping of communities by both organizing the ‘reparable’ 
part of population, and eliminating the hopeless division as in Stalinist and Nazi re-
pressions and mass executions. 
So once again the identity of the Soviets in Estonia became defined through 
distinctive Communist features. The Bronze Soldier became the dominant of the 
identity discourse of the Estonian Soviets, and so also communicative situations 
were solved using the monument. At the same time, the Soviet (and unfortunately 
also Russian) propaganda was and is turning the Estonian state and Estonians into 
physical constituents (although loaded with certain negative value systems) of 
the communicative situation. In this case it refers to the status of an enemy with 
whom it is not possible to communicate or with whom one just will not communi-
cate, but whom one semiotizes unilaterally. Examples can be drawn from the offi-
cial discourse (for example, Russia’s unilateral withdrawal of signatures from the 
Estonian-Russian border treaty already as early as 2005) to daily routine (for exam-
ple, fire-arms target practise using pictures of high-profile officials of the Estonian 
state in the Nashi Seliger camps). And yet we can see that in some years the whole 
issue around the Bronze Soldier seems to have faded and the status of the monu-
ment seems to have receded to its prior state - it seems to have abandoned its status 
as a social object and has been transformed into a cultural one. According to the 
opposite logic of turning a physical object into a social one, it seems that the Bronze 
Soldier may, in time, even give up its status as a cultural object in favour of that of a 
simple artifact or physical object in the Tallinn military cemetery – similarly to the 
way of the transition of a Dakota’s red rock described by Lips. Of course, this super-
ficial conclusion does not mean that the final reference of the monument as a token 
in a cemetery would be the concrete one in the sense of falling into the category of 
mere physical objects. At the same time this option might be at least imagined, if one 
thought of future generations brought up in Estonia (again, we have to repeat that 
the same mechanism might apply for several states previously under the influence of 
the Soviet rule – e.g., the Communist memorials in the Memento Park at the city of 
Budapest).
The descriptive and explanatory discourse offered to the Estonian Soviets by 
the Russian language media was efficiently turned into nominative discourse (for 
example, a virtual equationmark drawn between ‘Estonians’ and ‘fascists’ by virtue 
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of which Estonians became a condensed signifier of specific descriptions and char-
acteristics), which always helps to explain the world in fairly primitive and simple 
ways. Following the message of the Putinized media, Kripke’s “man over there with 
champagne” reappeared: it did not matter for a Soviet whether or not Estonians 
(Poles, Latvians, etc.) in fact supported the Nazi mentality, for if they had moved a 
Soviet symbol (e.g., the Bronze Soldier), they consequently had to be holding a glass 
full of Fascism. During this process, names became condensed containers of descrip-
tions, or designators in Kripke’s terms. After these designators have been used 
enough and long enough, they become legitimized and obtain the status of proper 
names – this is an extremely widespread practise of totalitarian regimes in their 
manipulations with their population (see, for example, words or descriptive names 
such as ‘kulak’, ‘Jew’, ‘Nazi’, ‘capitalist’, ‘imperialist’). Totalitarianism refers to not 
only political regimes, but also culturally and religiously rigid systems. Also, politi-
cal totalitarianism can mingle with other areas of sociocultural systems, for example, 
identity discourse. When discussing our example of discursive practise (Figure 2) 
with Gellner’s above-mentioned logical possibilities for identification as categorizing 
the alien or the hostile, we can see how originally so-to-speak neutral definitions are 
turned into designators. Or, in other words, the semantic field of names and nam-
ings that are ideologically loaded with descriptions changes, and once again it is 
proved that denotation is nothing but the most accepted connotation: for example, 
‘Estonian’ in the context of the above-described contemporary Soviet-Putinist dis-
course is a collective name used to refer to a people with specific negative character-
istics, representing certain negative metaneeds.
Continuity of metaneeds and semiotic management 
of communicative situations
All the above-mentioned oppositions of metaneeds were and are also carefully 
taught to those called ‘useful idiots’. This process of education has deep historical 
roots and is by no means casual or episodic. Conceptions of good and evil, virtue 
and sin, humanity and inhumanity, the spiritual and the material and all the relevant 
paradigms of metaneeds are shaped in the course of many decades. Even if seem-
ingly new paradigms are formed, it usually means the transformation of the existing 
ones and mostly cosmetic changes. Even though most ideas about the creation of a 
New Man have associated the new level of being with discarding the past, they have 
actually always been based on a deep-rooted historical mentality of peoples and peo-
ple. The manufacturing of the Soviet Man is no exception, and has been associated 
with the Russian Orthodox mentality: as claimed by several authors (for example, 
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Berdyaev 1937, Levin 1988), the essence and ultimate mission of the Soviets were 
derived from the key aspects of Russian Orthodox faith. The latter were defined 
and discussed by, for example, Pavel Novgorodtsev (1923) as follows: contemplation 
(созерцание), humility (смирение), spiritual simplicity, delight in God, the need for 
external expression of religious feeling, and expectancy of the Heavenly Kingdom. 
A similar treatment of the Russian Orthodox faith that allows seeing the transfer 
of the so-called macrosignifieds (on this term, see Danesi and Perron 1999) from 
religious thought into Communist ideology, views the mystical aspect and power of 
the Russian Orthodox Church as the closest to the source which reveals the mission 
of the so-called Russian spirit or soul (see, e.g., Zenkovski 1923). Apparently, the 
essence of the saviour mission was transferred and used in Communist ideology, just 
as the so-to-speak minor nuances and culture traits of orthodoxy found exploitation 
there – for example, the transformation of the icon corner into the ‘Red Corner’, reli-
gious processions into parades, Orthodox pennants into revolutionary pennants and 
slogans, and so forth. 
Alongside with material assets and cultural traits that were brought from Ortho-
doxy and Czarism into Communism, another feature is common to both the 
Russian Orthodox and the Soviet mentalities – this concerns the immateriality of 
the ultimate essence and true being of humans: higher existence and the meaning 
of life, so to speak, do not lie in the ordinary environment, in consumer culture and 
(mundane) things. Rather, the aim and end of human existence is to serve a higher 
institution and the future, while the individual need not ever see that future or insti-
tution oneself: the question is one of faith. The individual is subject to fulfilling a 
role in the community, and it is the latter that finally reaches the promised future. 
The Orthodox man serves God with the goal of arriving in Paradise where all things 
mundane lose their meaning and all that remains are the immaterial eternal values. 
Obviously, the same logic of explaining daily routine and the futility of everyday 
life hardships was carried into Communist ideology. Similarly, it was relatively easy 
to bring a large socium to serve a communist Leader; it was even less complicated 
due to the long Czarist history of the Russian nation. A life-long commitment to the 
Leader and the Party went hand-in-hand with understanding self-sacrificing efforts 
in terms of work and living in extremely undemanding primitive conditions – all 
exertion was explained through the prism of the community and being convinced in 
the bright Communist future of the Soviet Man and eventually the whole world. The 
Soviet culture of poverty (this should be understood as a term) and stealing is can 
be explained quite straightforwardly, if we keep in mind that the mundane material 
welfare was so insignificant and the meaning of life was elucidated through sacred 
categories and spiritual metaneeds. The transfer from the Russian Orthodox mental-
ity in combination with the Czarist paradigm to Soviet ideology and the formation 
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of a Soviet sociocultural space followed routine symbol management (for the rel-
evant semiotic mechanism, see Ruesch 1972: 277–298). After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the creation of the presidential Russia was just as easy due to a flash-
back to the pre-Soviet era, and the formation of the Putinized Russia pursued the 
binding of all three previous major paradigms (the Orthodox, the Czarist, and the 
Soviet) of making sense of the world.
It is important to pay attention to the duration of the process of creating the New 
Man that has been long-lasting, and is still going on – in Russia, for example, in the 
forging of the so-called Putin-generation. Likewise, it is imperative to understand 
that the semiotic techniques used to design the brains of yet another New Man pro-
vide clues for understanding such guidelines for making sense of the world that are 
based on a paradoxically quite uncontroversial combination of the rational and the 
mystical (or the mythical). Following Pareto, it makes sense to say that a member 
of the ‘Putin generation’ rationalizes the world mystically, and that the seemingly 
irrational explanation of the world is, in fact rational for such a community, keeping 
in mind also the pragmatic dimension of intelligence. This is possible by (a) effec-
tive manipulation of the three types of objects mentioned above in communicative 
situations, together with (b) skilful operating with historical metaneeds and macro-
signifieds, and (c) actual daily symbol management (producing, using, marketing, 
degrading symbols). These three major facets of shaping and maintaining contem-
porary worldview in Russia have lead to the creation of a specific (yet not unique) 
sociocultural reality which might, at a superficial glance, seem to be composed of 
so-called impossible objects and constructs. 
Yet what else are we to call a sociocultural system guided by a national leader 
who is idealized and idolized by extremely diverse social target groups such as, for 
example, heterosexual teenagers, homosexuals (it must be stressed that sexuality is 
not insignificant in this case), retired people, animal rights defenders, and so on. 
One might just recall reports – and it is significant that these reports are always illus-
trated – on Putin’s activities such as shooting a tiger with tranquillizer, riding a tri-
cycle at a communion of bikers, riding a horse half-naked with a shotgun, applying 
a tracking device to a polar bear, hugging a puppy and a baby, freeing a leopard to 
the wilderness, waving from a military jet plane, and so on and so on (on and on 
also in time). According to a common sociological truth, in a situation labelled as a 
culture change brought along by rapid transformation of the societal structure and 
economy, the cult of a leader is facilitated. This is supported by an identity discourse 
largely based on the sharpening of an opposition between the own and the alien, 
explained through good and evil, the own and the hostile and other similar meta-
needs and evaluative standards. Kripke’s ‘man over there with the champagne in his 
glass’ comes into play again – the leader is a leader, be s/he holding a gun, a puppy, 
or a tricycle, and there is no logical inconsistency from the viewpoint of possibly 
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inconsistent subcultural groups until they belong to the same suprasystem. After a 
common ground has been found (or founded), it is not too difficult to manufacture 
a new identity discourse on which to build a New Man who will eventually discard 
his original sociocultural paradigm. The cultivation of identity through envisag-
ing ‘others’ and ‘enemies’ is a plain and widespread technique, it is even possible to 
maintain that “[...] identification is often most consequential as the categorisation of 
others, rather than as self-identification” (Jenkins 2008: 15). 
Categorization helps to raise a community’s cohesion most effectively through 
opposition, and the logical end-point of that opposition is the division of people, 
communities, states or other social units into ‘own’ and ‘enemies’. One of the most 
curious results in the perception of the surrounding as a hostile environment is the 
Putinized Russians’ awareness of Estonia as one of Russia’s most dangerous ene-
mies – in 2007 even the leading one, when, according to the Levada Center, Estonia 
topped the list of Russia’s enemies at 60%2. Of course, on the other hand, the Putin 
administration’s Russian identity discourse has had to focus on internal consolida-
tion, and this has lead to results very similar to what is known from the era of the 
Nazi and Soviet attempts to create a new and better generation for a new regime. 
Those results range from adoration of Putin in poetry and songs (probably the most 
famous of them being “The One Like Putin” by the group Singing Together) to the 
organization of a mass marriage of members of the Nashi establishment, and arrang-
ing their mass wedding and mass copulation in tents on river boats in 2007.
Such tendencies are interesting, even for the mere reason of representing spe-
cific metaneeds that have been openly and formally condemned ever since the 
Nuremberg Trials. Yet the nationalist and chauvinist ideologies that prevailed in 
the world in the early 20th century are looming everywhere at the beginning of the 
twenty first century as well. Besides Russia, some of the most colourful examples of 
such metaneeds and identity construction are North Korea, Belarus, Turkmenistan. 
The latter is one of the most noticeable regimes even nowadays, not to talk about 
the period of Turkmenbashi’s (“Head of all Turkmens”) rule when Saparmurat 
Atayevich Niyazov assumed the position of the leader of Turkmens and replaced the 
existing cultural core units of the identity discourse with those chosen at his own 
free will, for example, his pseudoreligious Ruhnama. Besides such quite extreme 
cases, a similar direction seems to have been chosen by several European countries 
whose leaders have claimed the failure of multiculturalism (in 2012, for example, 
Germany, UK). 
It is obvious that these – although negatively – exciting examples and trends 
touch upon a tremendously wide range of issues and affect all modes of human and 
2  Golov, A. 2007. Дружественные и недружественные страны для россиян. 
http://www.levada.ru/press/2007053003.html. Retrieved 23.02.2014.
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societal life. Likewise, they have been – and are – subject to extensive metalevel dis-
cussions; while the present article is by no means trying to summarize these cultural 
and metacultural reflections as a holistic presentation. To a certain extent, the dis-
cussion in the present article is limited by actual evidence and illustrative material 
of the Bronze Night as extremely limited and mostly audiovisual. The relevant self-
identification, exclamations of identity, reasoning of conduct in openly expressed 
form are virtually not to be found in any of the written sources. At the same time 
the case was about events that are not possible to reinstate or reconstruct as evidence 
based on what actually took place in the streets (see Liiv 2007), as the acts of loot-
ing were backed up with meaning only retrospectively. For this reason, the evidence 
matter of the article was restricted, while one of its main goals was to disclose a cer-
tain logic of semiosis and communication that is relatively simple and easy to gener-
ate, relying on connections between primary needs and metaneeds, primary groups 
and secondary groups, abstract referents and concrete referents, sensing the physical 
and the semiotic reality so as all these connections meet and merge in the types of 
objects in communicative situations.
Our interest here was a little less pretentious: how is it primarily technically pos-
sible, and how is it so easily possible, to create phenomena that we can call impos-
sible sociocultural objects (let us remind of the so-called Penrose triangle)? One 
way to explain this is exactly through manipulation with different types of objects in 
communicative situations, as this manipulation is eventually based on the legitimi-
zation of specific metaneeds.
The case in point is pretty much opposite to Lotman’s and Uspenskij’s treat-
ment of objects and names. They dealt with proper names as signifiers that have no 
immanent connection with the objects they stand for, also, names are not character-
ized by differential features. On the other hand, if we think about the conception 
of macrosignifieds, we can see that there is something that unites similar ideolo-
gies, names and objects in dissimilar times and places (for example, Hitlerjugend --- 
Young Pioneers --- Nashi/Putinjugend; Arian Man --- Communist --- Nashist; Third 
Reich --- Heavenly Kingdom --- bright Communist future --- a proud and mighty 
Russia of the future). Now the fact of bearing a given name becomes a characteris-
tic, and a characteristic is already a distinctive feature of the given object. Therefore, 
names indeed can be used in the actual comparison of objects and phenomena. 
Naturally, at this point we keep in mind not only the linguistic etymology of names 
and proper names, but also the sociocultural etymology of them. And naturally, the 
issue is not only about the few vivid examples – that simultaneously are also typi-
cal – that were given, but rather concerns considerably broader developments (for 
example, the so-called Arab Spring, the events in North Africa in and since the 
2010s).
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The sociocultural etymology of names for phenomena and things is in direct 
connection with the categorization of objects into different types in communicative 
situations. Communicative situations that occur in totalitarian information spaces 
form telling examples of unilateral semiotization of the world. Unilateral semioti-
zation, in turn, makes it quite easy to manipulate the status of objects around us, 
since information involved in such communicative situations is principally indisput-
able. In the above examples we saw how a physical object (the Bronze Soldier) that 
may or may not — it depends on one’s knowledge of history and personal connec-
tion with the events of WWII — take the role of the cultural object, was so over-
loaded with metaneeds that it did not even assume the function of forming a space 
for action (for example, mass demonstrations and speeches held at the monument). 
Rather, it was turned into a social object and an actor in communication; not only 
did the monument symbolize cultural values and historical events (at this point it is 
irrelevant whether or how the latter actually occurred), but it was also turned into 
an active agent (which is why its physical relocation obtains particularly interesting 
connotations). In Parsonian terms, the situational elements obtained specific mean-
ings, turned into cultural symbols for social selves and started to mediate commu-
nication between intracultural (in this case, Soviet) agents and intercultural agents 
(in this case, between Estonians and Soviets, the European Union and the Putinized 
Russia). For Parsons, as suitably also for us, this is the point we should principally 
be able to talk about the origin of culture (a post-Soviet Communist culture, a novel 
Putin-cult(ure)).
On the other hand, we saw that the case of the Bronze Soldier was not con-
nected with the birth of a new culture, but the whole event the result of a centu-
ries-long tradition of principles of making sense of the world and an established 
network of macrosignifieds that made possible the Russian Revolution, the creation 
of the Soviet Union, the concept of the World Revolution, the transition of Russia 
into a sovereign democratic state, and the re-introduction of a totalitarian regime 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In a semiotic community with a com-
mon paradigm of macrosignifieds, it is relatively easy to regulate the semiotic (and 
other) behaviour, to administer the system of symbols, and to alternate the statuses 
of objects. In totalitarian regimes (as already stressed, our examples of the Soviet 
Union and the Putinized Russia are but brief illustrations for developments all over 
the world), symbol and reality management is easier, since the semiotic reality of 
people is extremely unified and equalized. This holds also for objects forming com-
municative situations – just as it is relatively simple to transfer a physical object into 
a social one, it does not take much to make a social object into a cultural object (for 
example, Stalin, Hitler, Turkmenbashi or Putin seem as not so much social beings, 
but rather as carriers of values, goals, meanings). Although the cultural objects of 
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the communicative situation seem less active or even passive in comparison with the 
social objects, they possess a clearly higher potential of embodying and transmit-
ting meanings (and also macrosignifieds) in both time and space; cultural objects 
can be activated, certain meanings and even cultural themes can be switched on by 
the use of cultural objects. Cultural objects, in turn, may be embodied and turned 
into physical objects; being either a cultural or a physical object depends on knowl-
edge and intentions of social objects (for example, whether Lenin’s mausoleum and 
his body are semiotically loaded units or just any objects). It is noteworthy that the 
above-described examples can be met in contemporary discourse as well, concern-
ing alternative social and cultural circumstances. We can recall the events in Ukraine 
and accusation of ‘Ukrainian nationalists’ by Putin, Sergei Lavrov and other officials 
in these events3.
Summary
Totalitarian information spaces are extremely integrated, which is why it is not 
difficult to alternate the statuses of objects, as well as to integrate potentially very 
diverse social groups into a holistic society through a leader or a sociocultural hero. 
A vicious circle is quickly formed, for due to being a culturally loaded social object, 
the leader gets access to easy manipulation of semiotic reality and the social groups 
forming the given socium. Such socii, although being internally very easily manage-
able, have a very strong identity pattern and a univocal information space, and are 
interculturally and internationally extremely rigid. Totalitarian information spaces 
offer their members simple and strong identification discourses, they offer easy 
and unequivocal semiotization of the surrounding world, as well as set patterns for 
the creation, understanding and using communicative situations. Thus, totalitarian 
regimes are easy to live in as regards the daily routine of making sense of the world 
and other semiotic behaviour, and they can be attractive for this easiness as well – 
also in terms of the semiotic life of its members. Therefore, there is no paradox 
between the popularity of totalitarity and condemning it; nevertheless, as was said 
in the beginning, we are living in an interesting time to witness the rise of popularity 
of ideas and ideologies leading inevitably to conflicts between rather artificially (and 
easily) created sociocultural systems and communities. At the same time, the semi-
otic and non-semiotic simplicity of the creation of such systems and the efficiency 
3  RIA Novosti 2014. Putin Blames Ukrainian Nationalists for Crimea Secession. http://en.ria.
ru/world/20140318/188547762/Putin-Blames-Ukrainian-Nationalists-for-Crimea-Secession.
html. Retrieved 24.03.2014; also BBC News 2014. Ukraine Crisis: Russia Vows Troops Will 
Stay. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26414600. 
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of managing those systems is a guarantee that this interesting time probably will not 
end at all.
Above all, it was mentioned that in the context of globalization, the administra-
tion of communicative situations, or rather manipulation with people through that 
administrative activity is a curious phenomenon, and maybe it can only be explained 
by informational insularization that occurs in parallel with globalization. It seems 
that such explanatory logic is valid, finding especially vivid proof in the shape of 
totalitarian – thereby dissimilarly totalitarian – societal organizations.
At the same time, we can notice how contradiction, or at least paradox, between 
globalization and semiotic insularization in the technical, and possibly also other 
aspects vanishes. This nuance concerns the communicative situation and its com-
ponents. In case of extremely dense information exchange unprecedented in previ-
ous history, such meaningful units get together to an such extent that the mapping 
of their semantic fields (this means, the formation of meaningful paradigms in the 
Saussurean sense) shifts from the arbitrary (in the Saussurean sense) into already 
almost random, accidental. Saussure’s arbitrariness points at the conditional nature 
of relations between sign systems and the semiotic reality, and the so-to-speak objec-
tive reality: relationships between the conceptual world, semiotic devices as sign sys-
tems, and ‘reality’ are principally agreed upon. Yet that negotiability requires from 
members of the socium an understanding that is unified at least to a degree, at least 
a certain overlap of their perceptual and cognitive universes, for otherwise no com-
municational possibilities would emerge on either the level of sign systems or on the 
plane of contents. This stability of signs, sign systems and, thus, also of the semiotic 
reality is guaranteed by the crystallization of the bond between concepts and sound-
images (Saussure 1959: 65–74). In other words, while the relation of the semiotic 
reality and the surrounding ‘objective reality’ is arbitrary, it cannot be described as 
random – this relation has been and is being continually negotiated in the com-
munity and is, at least to a certain extent, unified in the socialness of sign systems. 
Relationships between the semiotic and the ‘objective’ reality are arbitrary in prin-
ciple, but they cannot be completely accidental – rather, they are inert, since in the 
opposite case sociocultural systems would lose their continuity and communicative 
possibilities between people as/and semiotic subjects would disappear in the end.
In the environment of globalization, the situation is different: meaningful entities 
(or cultural units or semiotic units) may enter essentially casual cultural spaces (or 
semiotic spaces or semiospheres) in which they can be (re-)contextualized accord-
ing to freely chosen manners and principles. Before semiotic globalization takes 
place as integrative unification of diverse cultural spaces, single and particular, often 
also discrete meaningful units spread into different cultural spaces. In this sense, 
separate semiotic communities do not exchange information about one another’s 
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cultural spaces, but borrow and lend liberally chosen semiotic units that are fitted 
together with one’s own existing sociocultural knowledge on the basis of will, needs 
and abilities. Or, in other words, such exchange and traffic of semiotic units does, 
by no means, already refer to the logico-meaningful integration (to use P. Sorokin’s 
concept) of the so-to-speak parent-communities of those units. Instead, such – for 
example, internet-based – communities have formed of members who have, through 
essentially unilateral communication, created, firstly for themselves and then for 
their fellow members, sufficiently filtrated semiotic environments – filtrated enough 
to consider the latter as fragmented and highly selective as in case of any other prin-
cipally totalitarian community.
The topic of the communicative situation re-emerges here in connection with the 
creation of both individual and collective identities: it is fairly easy to construct com-
municative situations when it is easy (including also maximally arbitrary and even 
accidental) to operate with the three types of objects forming those situations. In the 
so-called global(ized) world there have been created extensive possibilities for con-
structing identity on freely chosen grounds, and the manufacturing of those grounds 
is even simpler, since at will the status of physical, social, and cultural objects is 
quite easily changeable (even, for example, game-based virtual communities or very 
diverse fanatic religious communes and the transfer of their essential conditional-
ity into the physical environment and action). At the same time, in their closedness 
(in a systems theory sense) such communities are semiotically similar to insular 
totalitarian regimes in which the meaning of the world and its contents is mostly 
determined by the system’s internal feedback loops. And, simultaneously, there is 
apparently no controversy in the existence in certain totalitarian regimes of societal 
groups seemingly distant from one another – it is possible to conjoin them into a 
united socioculturally closed system by using opportunities to re-play the statuses of 
diverse objects in the semiotic and physical environment according to the situation 
at hand. Indeed, it seems that a general condition is the principal preservation of 
the macrosignifieds and their complexes that form the culture core – in diverse situ-
ations and group environments it is simply possible to give them dissimilar forms 
of expression. In this manner there appear – or rather, are made to appear – such 
sociocultural objects that in their arbitrariness are, as semiotic constructs, so-called 
impossible objects that still function in the sense of non-logical conduct as discussed 
by Pareto. Of these semiotic systems are formed that, in their closedness, are related 
to neither other semiotic realities, nor, often, the physical environment (the case of 
world-view prevailing over knowledge).
At any rate, in case of such socii (semiotically insularised as totalitarian, subcul-
tural, fragmentary or the similar) it is decisive that it is the concentration and con-
densation of descriptions into names that can be explanatory for the coordinated 
 Semiotic management of communicative situations  69
creation of clear-cut (and often also simplistic) frames of metavalues that, in turn, 
offers community members instructions for semiotizing the world and solving aris-
ing communicative situations and situations of semiotization in general.
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Семиотическое управление коммуникативных ситуаций: 
новые люди и старые методы
Как объяснить существование тоталитарных обществ в свете гегемонистских идеоло-
гий, которые были совсем недавно осуждены (нацизм, коммунизм, сталинизм, религи-
озный радикализм)? Как возникают информационные островки в глобализирующемся 
мире, где люди живут среди изолированных семиотических реалий? Как это возможно, 
чтобы массами манипулировали, исходя из рассуждений и политики, осужденных 
мировым сообществом? Почему люди должны страдать от режимов, типологически 
подобных тем, которые уничтожили их физическое и семиотическое прошлое? Эти 
вопросы рассматриваются в статье с целью увидеть логику в управлении семиотиче-
ских реалий посредством коммуникативных ситуаций, сосредоточиваясь прежде всего 
на том, как в последних конструируются объекты различного типа. Метапотребности, 
используемые в конструировании семиотических реалий, указывают на макроозна-
чаемые как элемен тарные единицы культурного ядра ценностно-ориентированной 
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структуры. Использование макроозначаемых и умелое манипулирование метапо-
требностями делают возможным создание новых семиотических видов в закрытых 
социокультурных системах, которые основаны на односторонней семиотизации 
окружающего мира и действуют посредством автокоммуникативной обратной связи. 
Приведенные примеры заимствованы из одного из наиболее сложных экспериментов 
по созданию Нового Человека и закрытой семиотической реальности – с территории 
бывшего Советского Союза и сегодняшней путинизированной России. 
Kommunikatiivsete situatsioonide semiootiline haldamine: 
uued inimesed ja vanad meetodid
Kuidas selgitada totalitaarsete kogukondade olemasolu alles üsna hiljuti hukka mõistetud 
hegemoonsete ideoloogiate (natsismi, kommunismi, stalinismi, radikaalse religioossuse) val-
guses? Kuidas on võimalik massidega manipuleerida, lähtudes taunitavatest mõttekäikudest 
ja poliitikast? Miks saab inimesi allutada režiimidele, mis tüpoloogiliselt sarnanevad neile, 
mis hävitasid nende füüsilise ja semiootilise mineviku? Käesolev artikkel tegeleb nende tee-
madega, püüdes tuvastada loogikat semiootilise reaalsuse haldamises kommunikatiivsete 
situatsioonide kaudu, keskendudes eelkõige sellele, kuidas viimastes konstrueeritakse erinevat 
tüüpi objekte. Semiootiliste reaalsuste konstrueerimisel kasutatavad metavajadused osutavad 
makrotähistatavate kui kultuurituumade elementaarüksuste väärtustepõhisele struktuurile. 
Makrotähistatavate kasutamine ning oskuslik manipuleerimine metavajadustega muuda-
vad võimalikuks uute semiootiliste liikide loomise suletud sotsiokultuurilistes süsteemides, 
mis põhinevad ümbruse ühepoolsel semiotiseerimisel ning toimivad autokommunikatiivsete 
tagasisidesilmuste kaudu. Toodud näited tulenevad ühest kõige keerukamast katsest luua Uut 
Inimest ning suletud semiootilist reaalsust – varasema Nõukogude Liidu ning tänapäevase 
putiniseeritud Venemaa territooriumilt. 
